general point is that the sharp recent rise in "the power of judges" the world over has attracted considerable notice. Titles like The Global Expansion of Judicial Power" (Tate and Vallinder 1995) and terms like "juristocracy" (Hirschl) and "courtocracy" (Scheppele 2002 ) proliferate precisely because that power has spread around the globe, in a development that seriously began only after World War II and that took on real momentum in the last thirty-five years.
All three of the books here under review offer not only comparative descriptions of this development in several countries, but also make important contributions toward developing an explanatory theory about the causes and consequences of this massive recent growth in judicial power the world over. Each, however, emphasizes a different aspect of the picture.
Alec Stone Sweet's Governing With Judges looks at the power to review laws for constitutionality in the post-World War II courts of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union and argues that this power has shown a tendency both to spread beyond the Constitutional Court to which it is formally restricted, down into the "ordinary" courts, and also to permeate partisan conflicts within the legislature. He believes this "judicialization of politics" is endemic in the dynamic of judging itself, and that both the institution of "a priori" judicial review and the presence of lengthy bills of rights accelerated this development.
Patrizia Pederzoli and Carlo Guarneri compare the exercise of judicial review in the U.S., England, Wales, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. They are particularly intrigued by the recent trend in some of the countries for major political controversies to end up in courts, decided by judges, rather than by elected legislators, and they explain this by looking at the combination of variations in the legislative partisan balance and variations in political institutions -particularly those for recruiting and promoting judges and those that structure the degree of separation between prosecuting and judging. Ran Hirschl's Toward Juristocracy focuses on four former British coloniesCanada, Israel, the Union of South Africa, and New Zealand -and argues that the delegating of constitutional review power to judges emerged out of the perception by dominant groups that their hegemony was threatened by the rise in power of previously subordinated groups, and that in fact this recent constitutionalization of rights has had largely negative consequences for marginalized, subordinated groups.
This review essay concentrates on these three books but, where appropriate, draws on other works in the large and fast-growing literature on this subject. It concludes with some independent reflections on the kind of political environment likely to produce the most luxuriant growth in judicial power.
I. World-Wide Increase in Judicial Power
Before World War I, and again as of 1942, only the United States and Norway had a court with power to throw out laws adopted by the national legislature (Guarneri and Pederzoli 135).
2 Today more than eighty countries do (Hirschl 1). This rapidity of the transformation of constitutions around the globe is nothing short of remarkable.
In both the U.S. (1803) and Norway (1866) this power came not explicitly from the written constitution but from court precedent (Smith 2000) ; Ryssdal 1981 (Smith 2000) .
During the 1940s and 1950s, the post-war wave of (in Hirschl's term)
"reconstruction" constitutions that instituted judicial review included Austria, Italy, Germany, France, and Japan, (Guarneri and Pederzoli 135, Hirschl 7, and Sweet 31). 1979 , Egypt 1980 , Canada 1982 , Belgium 1985 , New Zealand 1990 , Mexico 1994 , Israel 1992 -1995 Sweet 31; Guarneri and Pederzoli 136) . applied by courts to strike down ordinary legislation, giving the courts of Israel the power of judicial review (Jacobsohn 2000) .
Complicating the trend toward handing to judges via judicial review a policymaking power that had once belonged exclusively to legislatures (i.e., the power to determine the constitutional reach of the legislative power), were two additional trends enhancing judicial power, one that extended from the sixties through the nineties, and the second emblematic of the nineties. In the first, transnational courts in Europe in particular (the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights), and to a lesser degree other supranational tribunals, took on the power under various multilateral treaties to identify conflicts between national laws and transnational treaties with rulings that indicated that such conflicting laws should be eliminated in the home country, in effect behaving as though the treaty were a higher-law constitution.
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Ordinary member state courts that had enjoyed no previous exercise of judicial review power cooperated in this transformation, and began declaring their own country's laws void.
II. The Politicization of Judging: Guarneri and Pederzoli #1
The Guarneri and Pederzoli volume, which compares the systems of the U.S., England (and Wales), Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, and Germany, zeroes in on the second additional trend: These authors have noticed, particularly within the countries of Latin Europe-Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France-a trend that might aptly be called "the politicization of judging (or of courts)" (although they use for it Alec Stone Sweet's broader label, "the judicialization of politics.") These two co-authors identify a tendency In sum, when Guarneri and Pederzoli speak of "the power of judges," they refer not only to the increased saliency of, and heightened level of controversy over, the policy-making power that is inevitable in applying the vague laws characteristic of the bureaucratic welfare state that prevails in modern technocratic societies; and not only to the (judicial review) power of constitutional courts to throw out laws that conflict with constitutional rights. They refer also and particularly to the increased use of judicial power to intervene in decisive ways to alter the balance of partisan power.
Such an intervention did take place in the U.S. during the Bush v. Gore (2000) election case. While such instances are rare in the U.S. system, 7 that case illustrates a number of the claims of their book: such judicial power is likely to rise at times when neither party can mobilize a decisive majority; when such power is exercised, it makes the judges look particularly "political," and this fact raises questions about the legitimacy of judicial power; those questions typically lead to calls for reform. In the U.S. case, although some discussion focused on reform of the electoral college (rather than the judiciary), the only real reforms adopted aimed at improving the reliability of votecounting machinery. This aspect of the trend seems to stem not so much from divided government as from the same elevated rights consciousness of the civilized world that is fueling the movement to put increasing levels of control over domestic policy into the hands of judges. The link between this elevated rights consciousness of late-twentieth-century democracies and the judicialization of political power is noted by Guarneri and Pederzoli (e.g. at 12-3) but their own stance toward that consciousness is essentially to embrace it as the necessary handmaiden of democracy (e.g., at 1). The Sweet and Hirschl volumes, by contrast, treat it to a more extensive critical analysis.
The explanation with which Guarneri and Pederzoli begin their discussion in a broad sense characterizes the project of all three of these books:
To understand the specific reasons why judicial intervention in and that interest groups go to court when they lose in the legislature, is also by now an old story on this side of the Atlantic and the Great Lakes, as is the fact that judges sometimes order sweeping reforms on the basis of negatively worded rights (as when federal judges ordered prison reform or busing for desegregation).
That said, there is much else in their books that warrants attention, both from scholars of comparative politics who much too often study only the electoral branches, and from scholars of American courts, who too often fail to acquire the perspective on the judicial branch that can come from an exposure to other examples of it. It is long past time to abandon such a narrow focus; it produces a truly distorted picture of the politics of countries with constitutional courts and an unfortunately limited image of judging.
A. Alec Stone Sweet's Explanation
The Sweet book takes up five cases for analysis: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the European Community (Union). His goal is to develop a scientific, general theory of how constitutional courts function in democratic polities, and his interest in being scientific (along with the fact that Oxford Press did not impose on him as strong a copyeditor as they might have) produces a certain inelegance of writing style that makes his book (particularly in his first chapter, which explains his general theory of judging, and which I found most off-putting for jargon-like style) a bit harder to get through than the other two. 8 But it is worth the effort.
His basic conclusions are that a new set of norms, summarized by the phrase "modern constitutionalism," is effectively replacing the older ideology of parliamentary sovereignty in Europe, and is doing so in a self-reinforcing, self-strengthening feedback loop that is bringing about the judicialization of politics in two senses of the word. First, far more than previously, policy is being decided by constitutional courts in Europe, which courts have been strengthened by the adoption of comprehensive rights lists in constitutions but also by courts' enhancement of their own powers by novel interpretations of laws and constitutions that expand judicial power. If imaginable, European constitutional courts have the capacity to dominate policy even more than in the U.S. because European bills of rights are so extensive. They often contain statements of positive (as well as negative) rights-rights like the right to work, to adequate pay, to adequate housing, to leisure and vacations, to human dignity, and to old age pensions (as well as freedoms of speech, religion, privacy, etc.) (Sweet, at 42-43, lists them all).
Obviously, such extensive lists of rights will require balancing by someone, and if courts end up as the decider of last resort, they increasingly will adopt rules such as balancing or
proportionality tests or what Sweet calls "least means tests" (97-99). This is an elliptical reference to rules of the sort that say (hypothetically), "A law against direct incitement to mass murder of an ethnic group can be upheld only if it is the least drastic means available for securing the safety of the group in question; it may interfere with freedom of speech no more drastically than necessary for attaining the valid goal." Obviously when a legislature enacts a bill, it has thereby selected its preferred version of the balancing of the competing interests at stake. When a constitutional court steps in to substitute its own balance as more proportional or as a less drastic interference with protected freedom, it is performing a legislative (i.e., rule-making) function, dressed up in the forms of judging.
This invitation to judges to legislate that is generated by the lengthy rights lists in . In his version all bills, once approved in both houses, would be subjected to the review, but the Council's veto could get overridden with a 2/3 vote in each house of Congress. Thus, 1/3 plus one vote in either house coupled with a majority of the justices could block a law. On the continent, as should have been predictable, whenever the legislative minority in opposition to a law is big enough in these abstract review systems, if they seriously oppose the law, they go to court to ask for a reversal (of course, dressing their request in proper legal discourse.) The mere threat that they might do so is often enough to get the majority to compromise so as to stave off a court challenge or to rephrase the law to comport with the language of constitutional court precedent.
When the latter transpires, Sweet points out the second sense in which judicial influence comes to dominate legislative bodies: legislative discourse, indeed legislative thinking, has become shaped by judicial readings of constitutions. In anticipatory reactions, legislators ask themselves, "Will this bill be ruled unconstitutional?" and then modify the bills according to the expected response of the Constitutional Court. Thus, the thinking of the Constitutional Court takes over the legislative process by insinuating itself into the very minds of the legislators. Sweet sees this version of the judicialization of politics being pushed first by the opposition that initiates or threatens a constitutional challenge because it wants to win on the policy question, but also by the ruling party whenever it incorporates the anticipated judicial response into their framing of the bill to avoid a court challenge.
Sweet focuses with good reason on the relatively new power of constitution-based judicial review. He freely acknowledges that European judges often "interpreted" statutes so as to render them barely recognizable to the legislatures that adopted them, and that this practice was no secret. So judicial power per se is not what is new. The interpretive power of judges was always overridable by a determined legislative majority.
Constitutional review is a different story. Although in terms of the mechanical requirements, constitutional amendment is considerably easier in European polities than in the U.S., 9 and thus in principle could be used to check the courts, the current European ethos seems to have rendered it largely unusable. In Spain, for instance, the constitution can be revised by a 3/5 vote in each of the two legislative houses, or, if a rights provision 9 With respect to review by the two European courts, the European Court of Justice wielding the EU treaty or the Court of Human Rights wielding the Convention on Human Rights, the situation differs markedly. Treaty amendment to override a court interpretation is extraordinarily difficult, requiring not only unanimity from every single member of the Union, or participant in the Convention, but after that in several of the countries approval by a referendum. The practical politics of the situation would seem to push nation states unhappy with a particular result to install new judges on the court to get new interpretations (for which a mere majority would suffice), rather than embark on the Sisyphean task of overruling the court via treaty amendment. To the extent that not even the constituent power of the people can alter certain parts of the Constitution or principles that judges claim to find therein, judges rule the 10 The other country requirements are as follows: France, majority of each house plus 3/5 of the Congress sitting as a whole; Germany, 2/3 majority of each house; Italy, majority of each house plus referendum unless the majority in each house was 2/3 (Sweet 59).
land. Only new interpretations from the high courts can alter these "core" parts of these constitutions, and since interpretations are altered far more typically by new judges than by their original authors, the power to select and appoint (and remove) judges becomes absolutely fundamental. Sweet does not give attention to this issue (beyond stating the formal selection, tenure, and eligibility rules at 46-49), although he does note that when a party of long-term dominance is ousted, one can expect a temporary rise in the number of judicial-legislative clashes, which will diminish over time as the newly dominant party puts its judges into power. Guarneri and Pederzoli analyze judicial recruitment extensively, so I will return to their book below.
The only political check on the judging power explored and acknowledged by Sweet stems from judges' concern for having their rulings carried out. This concern, which extends to a concern for maintaining their own legitimacy (diffuse support) moves judges, he says, to adopt decisions that "split the difference" between opposed parties, in effect trying to come up with moderate, compromise solutions. This practice of the judges amounts to an internalized political constraint. By avoiding producing decisions at a political extreme, they seek to assure that their policy-making will be viewed as unbiased and fair (Ch.1, ch.5, pp.90, 200) .
The truly fascinating sections of both the Sweet and Hirschl books are the many illustrative case accounts provided in both of them. In these case accounts, Sweet is at his best, offering lucidly detailed and nuanced narratives of the delicate interplay of political and judicial forces that combine to produce policies on politically volatile issues. Similarly, one can read detailed accounts of the political forces producing abortion law reform in Spain and Germany (twice) and of the complicated judicial responses to these reforms (Sweet 109-113). In Germany, for instance, the Court does not allow abortion to be "legalized" but does allow an open policy to let it "go unpunished" under a detailed set of (generally permissive) circumstances. The practical difference seems to be that "legalization" in Germany would entail government or insurance company funding of abortion costs, so such funding has now been cut off.
The difference between calling something legal and calling it "permitted to go unpunished" has parallels in a number of the other particularized case accounts. For example, the Italian Constitutional Court in coming to terms with the European Court of Justice assertion that even the Italian Constitution must give way to the ECJ's interpretation of the demands of the EEC Treaty and EEC law, produced another ruling that is likely to strike American readers as a legal fiction: In Italy's Constitution, "judicial review" of legislation for constitutionality is reserved to the Italian Constitutional Court, but since the ECJ ruled that national laws in conflict with Eurolaw must be treated by all judges as invalid, the constitutional court simply ordered ordinary judges in Italy to "ignore" any law that conflicts with EEC law (rather than declare it void, which declaration would usurp its own prerogatives!) (Sweet 166-8 and n.11)
The limitations of space in this essay do not permit doing justice to the many intriguing case stories included in this book. They alone would warrant the cost of purchase, because they shed so much helpful light on the actual judicial-legislative interaction that lies at the heart of the "judicialization of politics" in Europe. This thesis differs from, although it has parallels with, the "thin political" rational choice explanation that one often sees: viz., political parties or groups that have been dominant in dictatorial (or other) situations willingly entrench judicial power to protect themselves from later retaliation from their enemies, and do so in alliance with groups that fear regression back to dictatorship. Their hope is that neutral judges, committed to rule-of-law rights will give them a fairer shake than their unchecked political enemies would. 12 Hirschl does not disagree with these accounts so much as he finds them incomplete. They cannot explain why legislative forces in countries, like England or Canada, that get along for centuries without judicial review and with liberal rights generally honored would suddenly adopt entrenched bills of rights to be enforced against legislatures by courts. Moreover, they fail to take account of cleavages in other domains than electoral conflict, such as cultural and social cleavages. Finally, they fail to pay adequate attention to the political influence wielded by judicial elites and economic elites in bringing about transitions to juristocracy (Ch.2).
Hirschl's answer to the second query, on the policy consequences of judicial empowerment is that the kind of elite judges likely to serve on Supreme Courts are judges who support individualistic, secular, personal freedoms, such as due process for the accused, speech and press, abortion, equal treatment for gays, and ( and '90s.
Suddenly, in 1992, after years of opposition to an entrenched bill of rights, the politically dominant but soon to be non-dominant Ashkenazi changed their tune. The Basic Law does not say explicitly that Israel's Supreme Court has the power to throw out legislation, but that court had exercised such activist administrative review and aggressive legislative "interpretation" (altering apparent meanings of laws in order to have them conform to certain principles such as equality before the law) long before the advent of a written Bill of Rights (Jacobsohn 1993) , that its use of the new list of rights and liberties in the Basic Law to rescind legislation was quite predictable. Incidentally, as with the European examples, the Israeli Basic Law strikes an American as remarkably easy to amend (it takes only a majority of the total Knesset), but the practice seems to be that entrenched provisions do not later get altered.
In Canada the adoption of a Constitution and Charter of Rights took place in 1982, and Hirschl attributes its adoption to a perception by the Anglophone, Protestant, business-oriented "establishment" that its political and cultural dominance was being threatened by the Quebec separatist movement "and other emerging demands for provincial, linguistic, and cultural autonomy" (p.77). Canada's Constitution has a "notwithstanding" clause that lets the legislature refuse to honor a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, but as in Europe the political ethos is such that legislative forces refrain from attempting to override the Court. (148) (149) (150) 168) . This section seems to attack a straw man.
Hirschl's broader claim, however, is far more cogent. He sees the constitutionalization of rights and the move toward juristocracy as part of a broader neoliberal global trend toward delegating power away from electorally accountable bodies and toward quasi-autonomous decision-makers-not just constitutional courts but also civil-service-protected administrative bodies, and transnational decision-makers, whether self-appointed (as in the IMF and World Bank) or appointed as independent judges (as in the WTO, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the American Court of Human Rights, and the International Criminal Court).
IV. Distrust of Majorities and Judicial Recruitment: Guarneri and Pederzoli #2
A close look at these three books leaves the indelible impression that the worldwide trend toward democratization has been accompanied by a world-wide increase in distrust of majoritarian power. That distrust, per Hirschl, has fueled the constitutionalization of rights. The Sweet book teaches us that efforts to limit and channel that distrust into courts of tightly constrained powers were grounded in a mistake about the ways judicial power grows. The Guarneri and Pederzoli book indicates that when political forces approach electoral deadlock, power will be sought via other channels, particularly judicial.
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For all these reasons, the politics of judicial recruitment becomes fundamental, and on this topic the Guarneri and Pederzoli book is indispensable. This book details not only the judicial recruitment and promotion systems of seven countries, but also the relation between the prosecutorial arm in those countries and the judiciary, and the relation between both of these and the political forces in each country (chs. 2-4). It matters for judicial power and judicial independence, for instance, whether one party or majority coalition stays in power for long periods or (as happens in the U.S.) alternates in power with its opposition. J.Mark Ramseyer and Eric B.Rasmusen (2001) have demonstrated with the case of Japan that even a civil service system for judicial recruitment (appointing judges by competitive exam rather than political connections) with a bureaucratic career ladder can still produce judges who toe the party line, because those judges who do will be rewarded with promotions. (The promotion system is controlled by a body that answers to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court is politically appointed.) Thus, as long as political controls are built into the promotion system, courts can be kept subservient to political forces.
elected in large part by judges) indicates a broad awareness of these relations.
V. Conclusions
Martin Shapiro's (2002) thesis that constitutional courts are rendered powerful when they are in systems requiring them to police federalism boundaries or separation of powers boundaries can usefully be amended on this point. They are also powerful, other things being equal, when they are in systems where power alternates between differing political parties or coalitions or where the judicial promotion system renders them relatively free of political influence.
We know from the fate of post-Soviet courts in Hungary and Russia that Supreme
Courts can push only so far against majoritarian (or politically dominant) forces before they get politically taken over by new appointments or a taming of their jurisdiction or both (Scheppele 2002:262-268 and n.62 at 277). One of the things underlined in each of these three books, however, is just how far courts can push in the modern world without getting taken over politically.
